Just fifty years ago, Ernest Nagel and Kurt Gödel became involved in a serious imbroglio about the possible inclusion of Gödel's original work on incompleteness in the book, Gödel's Proof, then being written by Nagel with James R. Newman. What led to the conflict were some unprecedented demands that Gödel made over the use of his material and his involvement in the contents of the bookdemands that resulted in an explosive reaction on Nagel's part. In the end the proposal came to naught. But the story is of interest because of what was basically at issue, namely their provocative related but contrasting views on the possible significance of Gödel's theorems for minds vs.
for math students and I can remember well my excitement on getting the boxed set, though, as I found in its reading, the collection itself proved to be quite a mixed bag.
Newman, by the way, had been trained as a mathematician but then became a lawyer and was in government service during World War II. Endlessly fascinated with mathematics, he became a member of the editorial board of the Scientific American a few years after the war.
Ernest Nagel, as you well know, was among the leading American philosophers of science coming up in the 30s, along with Rudolf Carnap, Carl Hempel and Hans Reichenbach. Like them, he was an immigrant to the US, but unlike them he had come much earlier, in 1911 at the age of 10. Later, while teaching in the public schools, Nagel received his bachelor's degree at CCNY in 1923 and his PhD in philosophy at Columbia University in 1930. Except for one year at Rockefeller University, his entire academic career was spent at Columbia, where he was the John Dewey Professor of Philosophy and was eventually appointed to the prestigious rank of University Professor in 1967. In his philosophical work, Nagel combined the viewpoints of logical positivism and pragmatic naturalism. His teacher at CCNY had been Morris R. Cohen, and with Cohen in 1934 he published An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, one of the first and most successful textbooks in those subjects.
Soon after the appearance of Nagel and Newman's article on Gödel's 
theorems in
The World of Mathematics, they undertook to expand it to a short book to be published by NYU Press. And then they had the idea to add an appendix which would include a translation of Gödel's 1931 paper on undecidable propositions together with the notes for lectures on that work that he had given during his first visit to Princeton in 1934. Early in 1957 their editor at the Press, Allan Angoff, approached Gödel for permission to use that material. Though Gödel said he liked the Nagel-Newman article very much as a nontechnical introduction to his work, he said that he was concerned with some mistakes that had been made in it and even more so with the interpretation of his results, so he was reluctant about agreeing to the proposal. To encourage him to accept, Nagel paid a lengthy personal visit to him at the Institute in March of 1957. A week later, Gödel wrote Angoff with three conditions. One of the conditions was that he write an introduction to the appendix "in order to mention advances that have been made after the publication of my papers" as well as "to supplement the considerations, given in the book, about the philosophical implications of my results". A second condition, somewhat of a surprise, was that he share in some way in the royalties of the book. But the most contentious condition was the one he put at the beginning of his letter to Angoff: "In view of the fact that giving my consent to this plan implies, in some sense, an approval of the book on my part, I would have to see the manuscript and the proof sheets of the book, including the appendix." This condition was made even more explicit in a follow-up letter:
Of course I shall have to see the manuscript of the book before I sign the contract, so that I can be sure that I am in agreement with its content, or that passages with which I don't agree can be eliminated, or that I may express my view about the questions concerned in the introduction.
Gödel also wrote Nagel saying that he had made to Angoff "the same suggestions I mentioned to you in our conversation in Princeton." But when Nagel was shown the correspondence with Angoff, he exploded. He thought the proposal to share royalties was "grasping and unreasonable" yet was prepared to accept that. But what really ticked him off, as he wrote Angoff, was Gödel's number one condition: I could scarcely believe my eyes when I read his ultimatum that he is not only to see the manuscript of our essay before signing the contract with you, but that he is to have the right to eliminate anything in the essay of which he disapproves. In short, he stipulates as a condition of signing the contract the right of censorship.
This seems to me just insulting, and I decline to be a party to any such agreement with Gödel. … If [his] conditions were granted, Jim and I would be compelled to make any alterations Gödel might dictate, and we would be at the mercy of his tastes and procrastination for a period without foreseeable end. … Gödel is of course a great man, but I decline to be his slave.
Nagel's fears about how things might go if they agreed to this condition were indeed well-founded, but he left it in Angoff's hands to communicate his displeasure with it. accomodating but ambiguous way. It was not until August 1957 that Nagel wrote Gödel himself making clear his refusal to accept it: … I must say, quite frankly, that your … stipulation was a shocking surprise to me, since you were ostensibly asking for the right to censor anything of which you disapproved in our essay. Neither Mr. Newman nor I felt we could concur in such a demand without a complete loss of self-respect. I made all this plain to Mr. Angoff when I wrote him last spring, though it seems he never stated our case to you. I regret now that I did not write you myself, for I believe you would have immediately recognized the justice of our demurrer… This was passed over in silence in Gödel's response to Nagel. In the end, the proposal to include anything by him in the book by Nagel and Newman came to naught, and even the specific technical errors which Gödel could have brought to their attention remained uncorrected. Since this was to be the first popular exposition that would reach a wide audience, Gödel had good reason to be concerned, but by putting the conditions in the way that he did he passed up the chance to be a constructive critic.
As an aside, it is questionable whether Gödel indeed recognized the "justice of In consequence of later advances, in particular of the fact that, due to A. M.
Turing's work, a precise and unquestionably adequate definition of the general concept of formal system can now be given, the existence of undecidable arithmetical propositions and the non-demonstrability of the consistency of a system in the same system can now be proved rigorously for every consistent formal system containing a certain amount of finitary number theory.
Turing's work gives an analysis of the concept of "mechanical procedure" (alias "algorithm" or "computation procedure" or "finite combinatorial procedure").
This concept is shown to be equivalent with that of a "Turing machine". The import of Gödel's conclusions is far-reaching, though it has not yet been fully fathomed. They seem to show that the hope of finding an absolute proof of consistency for any deductive system in which the whole of arithmetic is expressible cannot be realized, if such a proof must satisfy the finitistic requirements of Hilbert's original program. They also show that there is an endless number of true arithmetical statements which cannot be formally deduced from any specified set of axioms … It follows, therefore, that an axiomatic approach to number theory … cannot exhaust the domain of arithmetical truth, and that mathematical proof does not coincide with the exploitation of a formalized axiomatic method. …
And next:
Gödel's conclusions also have a bearing on the question whether calculating machines can be constructed which would be substitutes for a living mathematical intelligence. Such machines, as currently constructed and planned, operate in obedience to a fixed set of directives built in, and they involve mechanisms which proceed in a step-by-step manner. But in the light of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, there is an endless set of problems in elementary number theory for which such machines are inherently incapable of supplying answers, however complex their built-in mechanisms may be and however rapid their operations. It may very well be the case that the human brain is itself a "machine" with built-in limitations of its own, and that there are mathematical problems which it is incapable of solving. Even so, the human brain appears to embody a structure of rules of operation which is far more powerful than the structure of currently conceived artificial machines.
They add, "there is no immediate prospect of replacing the human mind by robots."
And finally:
None of this is to be construed, however, as an invitation to despair, or as an What must have annoyed Gödel was that all of these were matters to which he had given a good deal of thought, in some respects with overlapping conclusions, in others contrary ones, but in all cases in much greater depth and with much more care and precision. The trouble was that almost none of his thought on these questions had been published. With respect to the first of these paragraphs, the significance of the incompleteness theorems for Hilbert's finitist consistency program was something that he had made only one brief cautious comment about at the end of his 1931 paper on undecidable propositions. But this was a matter he kept coming back to all through his life, as we found when we unearthed unpublished lectures and seminar presentations in his Nachlass. The first time his further views on this would begin to come out in print would be in 1958, a year after the imbroglio with Nagel and Newman. Soon after Gödel delivered that lecture he wrote of his intention to publish it, but he never did so; after he died, the text languished with a number of other important essays and lectures in his Nachlass until it was retrieved by our editorial group for publication in Volume III of the Gödel Collected Works (1995, pp. 304-323) . There are essentially two parts to the Gibbs lecture, both drawing conclusions from the incompleteness theorems. The first part concerns the potentialities of mind vs. machines for the discovery of mathematical truths, and it's that part that we should compare with Nagel and Newman's reflections. The second part is an argument aimed to "disprove the view that mathematics is only our own creation", and thus to support some version of Platonism. George Boolos wrote a very useful introductory note to both parts of the Gibbs lecture in Vol. III of the Gödel Works; more recently I have published an extensive critical analysis of the first part, under the title "Are there absolutely unsolvable 4 That was in the article, Gödel (1958) . As a sign of his concern with the issues involved, Gödel worked on a revision of that until late in his life (Gödel 1972 By a diophantine problem is meant a proposition of elementary number theory (aka first order arithmetic) of a relatively simple arithmetical form whose truth or falsity is to be determined; its exact description is not important to us. Gödel showed that the consistency of a formal system is equivalent to a diophantine problem, to begin with by expressing it in the form that no number codes a proof of a contradiction.
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According to Gödel, his dichotomy is a "mathematically established fact" which is a consequence of the incompleteness theorem. However, all that he says by way of an argument for it is the following:
[I]f the human mind were equivalent to a finite machine, then objective mathematics not only would be incompletable in the sense of not being contained in any well-defined axiomatic system, but moreover there would exist absolutely unsolvable problems…, where the epithet "absolutely" means that they would be undecidable, not just within some particular axiomatic system, but by any mathematical proof the mind can conceive. [Italics Gödel's] By a finite machine here Gödel means a Turing machine, and by a well-defined axiomatic system he means an effectively specified formal system; as explained above, he takes these to be equivalent in the sense that the set of theorems provable in such a system is the same as the set of theorems that can be effectively enumerated by such a machine.
In modern terms, consistency statements belong to the class ∏ 1 , i.e. are of the form ∀xR(x) with R primitive recursive.
Thus, to say that the human mind is equivalent to a finite machine "even within the realm of pure mathematics" is another way of saying that what the human mind can in principle demonstrate in mathematics is the same as the set of theorems of some formal system.
By objective mathematics Gödel means the totality of true statements of mathematics, which includes the totality of true statements of first-order arithmetic. The assertion that objective mathematics is incompletable is thus simply a consequence of the second incompleteness theorem in the form that for any consistent formal system S containing a certain basic system S 0 of (true) arithmetic, the number-theoretical statement Con(S) that expresses the consistency of S is true but not provable in S. Now Gödel's argument is that if the human mind were equivalent to a finite machine, orwhat comes to the same thingan effectively presented formal system S, then there would be a true statement that could never be humanly proved, namely Con(S). So that statement would be absolutely undecidable by the human mind, and moreover it would be equivalent to a diophantine statement. Note however, the tacit assumption that the human mind is consistent. Otherwise, it is equivalent to a formal system in a trivial way, namely one that proves all statements. Actually, Gödel apparently accepts a much stronger assumption, namely that we prove only true statements; but for his argument, only the weaker assumption is necessary (together of course with the assumption that the basic system of arithmetic S 0 has been humanly accepted). Also, Gödel's sketch to establish his dichotomy should be modified slightly, as follows: either humanly demonstrable mathematics is contained in some consistent formal system S, or not. If it is, then Con(S) is an absolutely undecidable (diophantine) statement. If not, then for each consistent formal system S, there is a humanly provable statement that is not provable in S, i.e. the "human mind … infinitely surpasses the powers of any finite machine." Note well that Gödel's dichotomy is not a strict one as it stands; Gödel himself asserts that "the case that both terms of the disjunction are true is not excluded, so that there are, strictly speaking, three alternatives." This could happen, for example, if the human mind infinitely surpasses finite machines with respect to certain diophantine problems, but not with respect to all of them. And if we drop the word 'diophantine' from its statement, it might be that the human mind could settle all arithmetical problems, but not all problems of higher mathematics. In fact, some logicians conjecture that Cantor's Continuum Problem is an absolutely undecidable problem of that type.
Be that as it may, how does Gödel's conclusion differ from that of Nagel and Newman? They speak of calculating machines "as currently constructed and planned,
[that] operate in obedience to a fixed set of directives built in, and [that] involve mechanisms which proceed in a step-by-step manner," where Gödel speaks more precisely of Turing machines. Still, to be charitable, I think that's a reasonable interpretation of what Nagel and Newman had in mind. Secondly, they don't make the connection between formal systems, in the first paragraph, and calculating machines in the second paragraph, where Gödel sees these as amounting to the same thing. But the essential difference is that they seem to come down in favor of the first, anti-mechanist, disjunct of the dichotomy when they say that "[by] Gödel's incompleteness theorem, there is an endless set of problems in elementary number theory for which such machines are inherently incapable of supplying answers, however complex their built-in mechanisms may be and however rapid their operations" and "the human brain appears to embody a structure of rules of operation which is far more powerful than the structure of currently conceived artificial machines;" furthermore, in the third paragraph they say that "the resources of the human intellect have not been, and cannot be, fully formalized, and … new principles of demonstration forever await invention and discovery." At the same time, they countenance the other disjunct, when they say that "[i]t may very well be the case that the human brain is itself a 'machine' with built-in limitations of its own, and that there are mathematical problems which it is incapable of solving." (Wang 1974, pp. 324-326) , and then at greater length in A Logical Journey.
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Calculating machines are assimilated more closely to axiomatic systems in the concluding reflections of Nagel and Newman (1957) , p. 100. (Wang 1996 , especially Ch. 6). So why didn't Gödel state that outright in the Gibbs lecture instead of the more cautious disjunction in the dichotomy? Well, the reason was simply that he did not have an unassailable proof of the falsity of the mechanist position. Indeed, he there says:
From Gödel to Philosophy
[It is possible that] the human mind (in the realm of pure mathematics) is equivalent to a finite machine that, however, is unable to understand completely its own functioning.
And in a related footnote, despite his views concerning the "impossibility of physicochemical explanations of … human reason" he says that
[I]t is conceivable ... that brain physiology would advance so far that it would be known with empirical certainty 1. that the brain suffices for the explanation of all mental phenomena and is a machine in the sense of Turing;
2. that such and such is the precise anatomical structure and physiological functioning of the part of the brain which performs mathematical thinking.
And in the next footnote, he says:
[T]he physical working of the thinking mechanism could very well be completely understandable; the insight, however, that this particular mechanism must always lead to correct (or only consistent) results would surpass the powers of human reason.
Some twenty years later, Georg Kreisel (1972) made a similar point in terms of formal systems rather than Turing machines:
[I]t has been clear since Gödel's discovery of the incompleteness of formal systems that we could not have mathematical evidence for the adequacy of any formal system; but this does not refute the possibility that some quite specific system … encompasses all possibilities of (correct) Both Benacerraf and Putnam soon objected to his argument on the basis that Lucas was assuming it is known that one's mind is consistent. Lucas, in response, tried to shift the burden to the mechanist: "The consistency of the machine is established not by the mathematical ability of the mind, but on the word of the mechanist," (Lucas, 1996) , a burden that the mechanist can refuse to shoulder by simply citing his empirical defense.
Roger Penrose (now Sir Roger) is the other noted defender of the Gödelian basis for anti-mechanism, most notably in his two books, The Emperor's New Mind (1989) , and Shadows of the Mind (1994) . Sensitive to the objections to Lucas, he claimed in the latter only to have proved something more modest (and in accord with experience) from the incompleteness theorems: "Human mathematicians are not using a knowably sound algorithm in order to ascertain mathematical truth." (Penrose 1994, p. 76) . But later in that work after a somewhat involved discussion, he came up with a new argument purported to show that the human mathematician can't even consistently believe that his mathematical thought is circumscribed by a mechanical algorithm (Penrose 1994, secs. 3.16 and 3.23). Extensive critiques have been made of Penrose's original and new arguments in an issue of the journal PSYCHE (vol. 2, no. 1, 1996) , to which he responded in the same issue. And more recently, Stewart Shapiro (2003) and Per Lindström (2001 Lindström ( , 2006 it is most likely that the human race will eventually be wiped out either by natural causes or through its own self-destructive tendencies by the time the sun ceases to support life on earth.
What about the assumption that the human mind is consistent? In practice, mathematicians certainly make errors and thence arrive at false conclusions that in some cases go long undetected. Roger Penrose, among others, has pointed out that when errors are detected, mathematicians seek out their source and correct them (cf. Penrose 1996, pp. 137 ff), and so it is reasonable to ascribe self-correctability and hence consistency to our idealized mathematician. But even if such a one can correct all his errors, can he know with mathematical certitude, as required for Gödel's claim, that he is consistent?
As Shapiro points out, the relation of both of these idealizations to practice is analogous to the competence/performance distinction in linguistics.
Next comes the assumption that the notions and statements of mathematics are fully and faithfully expressible in a formal language, so that what can be humanly proved can be compared with what can be the output of a machine. In this respect it is usually pointed out that the only part of the assumption that needs be made is that the notions and statements of elementary number theory are fully and faithfully represented in the language of first-order arithmetic, and that among those only diophantine statements of the form Con(S) for S an arbitrary effectively presented formal system need be considered. That seems unproblematic, but only if we regard statements of unlimited size accessible to human comprehension.
The next assumption that may be questioned is the identification of the notion of finite machine with that of Turing machine. Though this too involves idealizations of what can be computed without restriction on time or work space, it has been widely accepted as explicating the informal concept of effective computability. But the point of that idealization is to give the strongest negative results, to show that certain kinds of problems can't be decided by a computing machine, no matter how much time and space we allow. And so if we carry the Turing analysis over to the potentiality of mind in its mathematizing capacity, to say that mind infinitely surpasses any finite machine is to say something even stronger. It would be truly impressive if that could be definitively established, but none of the arguments that have been offered are resistant to the mechanist's empirical defense. Moreover, suppose that the mechanist is right, and that in some reasonable sense mind is equivalent to a finite machine; is it appropriate to formulate that in terms of the identification of what is humanly provable with what can be enumerated by a Turing machine? Isn't the mechanist aiming at something stronger in the opposite direction, namely in terms of the mechanisms that govern the production of human proofs?
Here is where I think something new has to be said, something that I already drew attention to in my article on Gödel's dichotomy, but that needs to be amplified. Namely, there is an equivocation involved, that lies in identifying how the mathematical mind works with the totality of what it can prove. Again, the difference is analogous to what is met in the study of natural language, where we are concerned with the way in which linguistically correct utterances are generated and not with the potential totality of all such utterances. That would seem to suggest that if one is to consider any idealized formulation of the mechanist's position at all, it ought to be of the mind as one constrained by the axioms and rules of some effectively presented formal system. Since in following those axioms and rules one has choices to be made at each step, at best that identifies the mathematizing mind with the program for a non-deterministic Turing machine, and not with the set of its enumerable statements (which of course is the same as that of a deterministic Turing machine).
One could no more disprove this modified version of the idealized mechanist's thesis than the version considered by Gödel, et al., simply by applying the mechanist's empiricist argument. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive of any formal system of the sort with which we are familiar, from Peano Arithmetic (PA) up to Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory (ZF) and beyond, actually underlying mathematical thought as it is experienced.
And mathematical practice certainly supports the conclusion drawn by Nagel and
Newman that "mathematical proof does not coincide with the exploitation of a formalized axiomatic method," even if that can't be demonstrated unassailably as a consequence of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.
As I see it, the reason for the implausibility of this modified version of the mechanist's thesis lies in the concept of a formal system S that is currently taken for granted in logical work. An essential part of that concept is that the language of S is fixed once and for all. For example, the language of PA is determined (in one version) by taking the basic symbols to be those for equality, zero, successor, addition and multiplication (=, 0, ′, +, .), and that of ZF is fixed by taking its basic symbols to be those for equality and membership (=, ∈). This forces axiom schemata that may be used in such systems, such as induction in arithmetic and separation in set theory, to be infinite bundles of all possible substitution instances by formulas from that language.
In recent years I have undertaken the development of a modified conception of formal system that does justice to the openness of practice and yet gives it an underlying rule-governed logical-axiomatic structure; it is thus a way of straddling the Gödelian dichotomy. This is in terms of a notion of open-ended schematic axiomatic system, i.e. one whose schemata are finitely specified by means of propositional and predicate variables (thus putting the 'form' back into 'formal systems') while the language of such a system is considered to be open-ended, in the sense that its basic vocabulary may be expanded to any wider conceptual context in which its notions and axioms may be appropriately applied. In other words, on this approach, implicit in the acceptance of given schemata is the acceptance of any meaningful substitution instances that one may come to meet, but which those instances are is not determined by restriction to a specific language fixed in advance.
The idea is familiar from standard presentations of propositional and predicate logic, where we have such axioms as P ∧ Q → P and (∀x)P(x) → P(a), and rules of inference such as P, P → Q ⇒ Q and [ P → Q(x) ] ⇒ [ P → (∀x)Q(x) ] (for x not free in P).
We do not conceive of logic as applying to a single subject matter fixed once and for all, but rather to any subject in which we take it that we are dealing with well-defined propositions and predicates; logic is there applied by substitution for the proposition and predicate letters in its axioms and rules of inference. Similarly to allow systems like those for arithmetic and set theory to be applicable no matter what subject matter we are to deal with, we formulate their basic principles in schematic form such as the Induction Axiom Scheme
in the case of arithmetic, and the Separation Scheme
in the case of set theory. (The idea for the latter really goes back to Zermelo's conception of the Aussonderungsaxiom as applicable to any "definite" predicate.) In addition to such basic schemata for logic, arithmetic, set theory and so on, for an overall account of mathematical practice we need a way for these systems to interact. That is provided by means of a background framework of a subject-neutral general theory of operations and predicates. It's not possible to go into the details of that here, except to say that the theory of operations employed is a version of the partial untyped lambda calculus.
Among other things within that framework one can establish such things as the categoricity of schematic PA as well as of some other basic systems, such as that for the real numbers.
By way of references, I presented a preliminary form of the general approach just indicated in a lecture for a meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic held at Stanford in March, 2005 (cf. Feferman 2006a . The full version has yet to be written up, but the details in more limited contexts have been spelled out in my articles, "Gödel's program for new axioms: Why, where, how and what?" (1996) , and, with Thomas Strahm, "The unfolding of non-finitist arithmetic" (2000).
To conclude, why such an emphasis on the openness of the language? Aren't all mathematical notions definable in set theory? That's a common view that is immediately refuted by Tarski's theorem: the notion of truth for set-theoretical statements is not itself definable within set theory. Another more mathematical notion whose full use is not settheoretically definable in current terms is that of a category; only so-called "small" categories can be directly treated in that way. And even if we had a language in which all mathematical notions could be defined, that would not serve to account for the applications of mathematics to non-mathematical subjects, such as physics. Finally, this accords with practice, in that mathematicians never thinkif they appeal explicitly to basic principles like induction at allthat they are working in some fixed language. All of this is by way of arguing that we must regard the subject matter of mathematics as an open-ended domain not generated by rules fixed in advance, and so in that respect it is non-mechanistic. At the same time I would claim that where the schematic principles employed, such as those for logic and arithmetic, are complete in a suitable sense, the mathematical mind is constrained to act in accordance with them, and thus to fall under a form of mechanism.
But isn't it time to move past these worn-out, tendentious terms? Our goal should simply be to give an informative, systematic account at a theoretical level of how the mathematical mind works that squares with experience. Characterizing the logical structure of mathematicswhat constitutes a proofis just one aspect of that. Other aspectsthe ones that are crucial in making the difficult choices that are necessary for the development of proofs of interesting theoremssuch as the role of heuristics, analogies, metaphors, physical and geometric intuition, visualization, etc., have also been taken up and are being pursued in a more or less systematic way by mathematicians, philosophers and cognitive scientists. That, all told, is where the action is at present and for the foreseeable future. Without abandoning a basic naturalist stance, I see no usable reductive account anywhere on the horizon at the neuro-physiological level, let alone 9 Cf., for example, Fischbein (1987) , Lakoff and Núñez (2000) , Mancosu, et al. (2005) , and Pólya (1968) , and the further references therein. more basic physico-chemical levels of the sort contemplated by Nagel and Newman and currently sought by Penrose, among others.
